

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE SIXTY-SEVENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Wednesday, 8 August 1962, at 10 a.m.

THE UNIVERSITY  
OF MICHIGAN

FEB 6 1963

DOCUMENT  
COLLECTION

Chairman:

Mr. A.H. DEAN

(United States of America)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. de ARAUJO CASTRO  
Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE  
Mr. JANOS LENGYEL

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV  
Mr. N. MINTCHEV  
Mr. G. GUELEV  
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON  
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY  
Mr. J.F.M. BELL  
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK  
Mr. M. ZEMLA  
Mr. J. RIHA

Ethiopia:

ATO HADDIS ALAMAYEHU  
ATO M. HALID  
ATO GETACHEW KEBRETH

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL  
Mr. A.S. LEHTA  
Mr. K. KRISHNA RAO

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. A. CAGIATI  
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI  
Mr. LUCIOLI OTTIERI

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO  
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG  
Miss E. AGUIRRE  
Mr. D. GONZALES GOMEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. ISU  
Mr. L.C.N. OBI  
Mr. F.B. KOSOKO

Poland:

Mr. M. LACHS  
Mr. S. ROGULSKI  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI  
Mr. W. WIECZOREK

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU  
Mr. H. FLORESCU  
Mr. E. GLASER  
Mr. O. NEDA

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL  
Baron C.H. von PLATEN  
General P. KALLIN  
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN  
Mr. L.I. LENDELEVICH  
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV  
Mr. V.V. ALDOSHIN

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. ELATTAH HASSAN  
Mr. M.H. EL-ZAYYAT  
Mr. A.E. ABDEL MAGUID  
Mr. S. AHMED

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER

Mr. B.T. PRICE

Lord NORWICH

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Mr. D.E. MARK

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I declare open the sixty-seventh plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Before I call on the first speaker, I should like to make a very brief announcement in my capacity as co-Chairman. As members of the Committee will recall, I announced on Monday (ENDC/PV.66, p.5) that I had been having some informal discussions with my co-Chairman, Mr. Zorin, on the question of a nuclear test ban treaty. Those discussions have been continuing and, with the permission of my co-Chairman, I would like to inform the members of the Committee that the participants in the Nuclear Test Ban Sub-Committee have agreed to hold a meeting of that Sub-Committee on Thursday, 9 August, at 3:30 p.m. My co-Chairman and I will confer further concerning the date next week which we will recommend to the Committee for a meeting of the plenary Conference on nuclear testing.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): My colleagues will recall that I deferred the speech I had intended to make at our last meeting, and I should now like to address myself to some of the problems I had meant to comment on then. Principally, I want to take up some of the criticisms made by our Soviet colleague on Friday last of the papers (ENDC/53 and ENDC/54) tabled by the United Kingdom a week ago, and I should like to touch also on some of the points arising out of Monday's debate. I think, too, that I should draw a few more conclusions from our papers -- conclusions which we had hoped would be fairly clear to our colleagues around this table, but which apparently failed in some ways to catch the attention of our Soviet colleagues.

Of course, the accusations of bad faith which cropped up regularly throughout Mr. Zorin's speech last Friday (ENDC/PV.65, pp. 37 et seq.) seem to be a part of his stock-in-trade. Repeated so often and with such complete absence of justification they do him, I think, little credit. I do not think they are worth answering in detail, but I want to come back to the United Kingdom papers in which a number of other representatives have shown considerable interest during informal discussions that we have had with them since we tabled them. We tabled the papers, first, because we wished to follow as clearly and as simply as we could point 5(b) of the co-Chairmen's recommendations -- of which, I must remind the Committee, Mr. Zorin was of course co-author -- to discuss:

"Disarmament measures in regard to nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, including the problems pertaining to the production of such vehicles, together with appropriate control measures..." (ENDC/52)

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Secondly, we tabled our proposals because the demands of the Soviet Union on this subject seemed to us to make such an investigation absolutely essential: for by the Soviet demand for 100 per cent elimination of delivery vehicles in the first stage of the disarmament process we are all bound to investigate the possibilities of verification with far greater thoroughness than would be necessary if it were only a case of partial reduction.

In the verbatim record of our meeting of 16 May, Mr. Zorin himself is reported to have said:

"I tell you that since we want 100 per cent elimination of armaments, we also want 100 per cent verification in order to ensure that nothing remains." (ENDC/FV.38, p.47)

We agree entirely that 100 per cent elimination must involve 100 per cent verification, and we therefore undertook our study in order to look at some aspects of the problem. There are, of course, much deeper problems in the whole concept of 100 per cent verification of one point in the process of disarmament -- of one part as opposed to the whole field. In other words, if one is taking verification of the whole field it is much less complicated than if one is seeking to verify 100 per cent in relation to one part and not the rest. But that I have dealt with before, and I think it is clear enough.

This is not a question which we can continue to ignore, however much the Soviet delegation may seek to turn us away from it. Do not let any of us here ever forget that a very few inter-continental ballistic missiles concealed by one country after the elimination of all the rest could change the face of the world, and such a change, whatever country were responsible for it, would not be a change for the better. This problem is vital at some stage in both plans. It would be foolish to pretend otherwise. But it need not be so acute in the first stage if Mr. Zorin would scale down his present proposals for the first stage. However, until he does so, he of all people has no right to complain if we seek to examine the problem now. He has thrust this problem upon us: then he should help us to study it.

The United Kingdom paper on the physical destruction of missiles and aircraft (ENDC/54) was submitted because we have talked a lot about bonfires in these last few months and we thought that it would be of interest to delegations to know what, in our opinion at any rate, those bonfires might amount to in practice. In another attempt to meet as far as possible the well-known Soviet obsession with espionage we deliberately included the suggestion that it might not be necessary at the

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outset to inspect all the more sophisticated equipment which the missiles and the aircraft to be destroyed might carry. We should perhaps have known from Mr. Zorin's reactions in the past to Western ideas about zonal inspection that he would not be very appreciative of efforts to meet his objections on that score.

But it is our other paper, the one on rockets, (ENDC/53) which has had to bear the brunt of Mr. Zorin's displeasure. I refer my colleagues to his comments on page 44 of the verbatim record (ENDC/PV.65). It may be that at first sight what he said then and what is written into article 5 of the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/2 and Add.1) gives the impression of a fairly comprehensive measure intended to prevent the illegal use of space development for threatening aggression. Mr. Zorin may genuinely feel that that part of his treaty is adequate, but I should like to remind him that we shall all need to share all his confidence if we are going to accept a treaty on the lines he proposes, and that many of us are still a very long way from doing so. Meanwhile we have a right to know what we are being asked to accept. I can assure our Soviet colleague that his treaty does give very real grounds for doubt, particularly in the light of his refusal over the last four months to give any real assurance whatever on this whole question of verification.

We know that the Soviet Union decided as a matter of policy to engage on a very large programme of space research and of development aimed at giving man the power to travel to the moon and the nearer planets long before the end of this century. I think that we should give the Soviet Union credit for its achievements in that field. I was sitting in this very Council Chamber on the day of the announcement of the first successful orbit of man in space -- a remarkable achievement. But I am drawing attention to that programme here because it is quite evident that, for the declared purposes of the Soviet Union in seeking to send man to the moon, no rockets so far in use are adequate; so that, simply setting aside a proportion of military rockets, as provided for in paragraph 1 of article 5 of the Soviet draft treaty, would not be enough. Such really fantastically difficult objectives will be reached only if the whole enterprise is supported by an enormous industrial complex with an expenditure which must run into thousands of millions of roubles a year and employ many thousands of people. Paragraph 4 of article 5 of the Soviet draft treaty is clearly intended to allow for the possibility of such a rocket production industry.

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That article lays down that the plants producing such rockets will be subject to supervision by the inspectors of the international disarmament organization. But there a difficulty arises. How are the inspectors of the international disarmament organization to know whether or not all the factories have been inspected? How are they to know that there is not, somewhere in the 22 million square kilometres of the Soviet Union, another factory capable of turning out finished missiles? We have asked the representatives of the Soviet Union this kind of question many times. They have never answered us. Thus we produced our paper (ENDC/53) as a kind of thinking out loud, to clear our own minds through the process of writing and through subsequent discussion with our colleagues in this Conference. There is nothing in that paper which was intended to be either for or against the Soviet draft treaty which we have before us. It was simply concerned with listing a few of the points which would have to be taken into account by any treaty dealing with this problem for all States -- any treaty, the treaty which we are going to produce which, as I have said so many times, will be neither a Soviet nor a United States treaty, but the treaty hammered out round this table. These facts must be borne in mind in reaching that agreed draft.

Let us look a little more closely at the question of control over launchings. I understand that the Soviet proposal is that the inspectors should be present at all the declared rocket sites and should have the right to see that no rocket is fired with a nuclear warhead. So far as that goes, it is perfectly all right, but here I come to the real point. If there happens to be either a clandestine stockpile or a clandestine factory which could be in association with a hidden launching site, and if the rockets are deliberately chosen to be of some very reliable type whose technology is well understood, then it would never be necessary for the possessor to make even one test firing from a clandestine site. Those rockets could sit there for years undisturbed, and perhaps already equipped with nuclear weapons which, of course, under the Soviet draft treaty, would still exist, even legally, well on into the whole disarmament process. The warheads would be still legal until the second stage.

What would that mean? Simply this: that, at the end of stage I, according to the Soviet draft treaty, when all nations would be under obligation to have surrendered their strategic delivery vehicles, any nuclear Power evading that provision would be capable of launching a devastating pre-emptive strike which could annihilate -- I use even such a strong word -- its political opponents.



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Mr. Zorin appears to say that all these objections of ours are far-fetched and that we are making them with the deliberate intention of wasting the Conference's time. We are not, of course, doing anything of the sort; we are merely applying a test which any responsible government will have to apply, and indeed which all the Governments represented at this table will apply before they will dream of signing any treaty at all. Do let us keep our feet on the ground in relation to this. This test is quite simply to ask whether any evasion of the treaty provisions could confer upon the evader -- particularly at a time early on in the disarmament process, before confidence had been built up -- the possibility of obtaining a significant strategic advantage. That is the point which we have been trying to make many times since the Conference began. We have been trying to say that life is not as simple as the representative of the Soviet Union seems to claim, and that we should be naive in the extreme if we allowed our Soviet Union friends to persuade us that all the problems with which we are faced can be solved by the over-simplification of the Soviet draft treaty as it is put before us.

Mr. Zorin has many times poured scorn on these objections of ours. The Committee will probably remember how he replied to the United States representative when Mr. Dean suggested that, even after the first stage in the Soviet draft treaty, civil vehicles capable of delivering nuclear weapons would still remain at the disposal of States. I quote Mr. Zorin's words in that connexion:

"It is hardly necessary to engage in polemics with the United States representative on all these matters. The arguments which we heard from him could be applied in regard to adventurers of the type of the OAS, who are operating in France and Algeria. But we shall not expatiate on the question of to what extent it is out of place to use arguments of this kind in respect of States and governments." (ENDC/PV.45, p.30)

Mr. Zorin was still finding it difficult to take these objections seriously as recently as last Friday, 3 August, when he pointed out that the use of civil aircraft to drop nuclear bombs would be unsatisfactory on account of the lack of speed and accuracy (ENDC/PV.65, p.42). He ignored, on that occasion, the point which I had made on 6 June (ENDC/PV.50, p.6) when I pointed out that certain Soviet civil aircraft even kept the bomb aimer's windows of their military counterparts; he also forgot that when one is dealing with bombs whose strength can be measured in megatons great accuracy of aim is no longer necessary.

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We are glad to note, however, that his views on the subject are no longer shared in the higher reaches of his Government. A month ago we had no indication at all that anything said here had had the slightest effect on Soviet thinking. However, on 10 July there occurred a very significant development -- a development in fact more significant than, I suspect, even the representative of the Soviet Union realized. That was the day on which, in his speech to the Moscow Conference for General Disarmament and Peace, Mr. Khrushchev made the statement which was quoted by Mr. Zorin on 1 August (ENDC/PV.64, p.22), and by Mr. Burns of Canada on Monday, 6 August, (ENDC/PV.66, p.21). Two repetitions might well be thought enough, but this passage seems to me to be so significant and so revealing that I make no apology for reading it out for the third time -- and I am sure that the representative of the Soviet Union could not possibly object to my quoting his own Chairman. I give the quotation again as follows:

"It is said that nuclear weapons can also be carried in TU-114s, Boeing 707s and other civil aircraft. But if there is a real desire for disarmament, the various countries may for a while keep their means of defence - anti-aircraft artillery, and air defence rockets and fighters. Modern means of warfare make it possible to shoot down any aircraft flying at any altitude.

As you see, the argument is thoroughly untenable." (ENDC/47, pp. 10, 11)

In passing, I will just make this one comment -- that I have always thought, ever since I first heard that quotation, that, if in fact it is true that modern means of warfare make it possible to shoot down any aircraft at any altitude, I wonder why our Soviet colleagues still have any bombers. That is something they can work out with their military advisers.

But, to come back to the quotation, why is that remark so important? It is important because, for the first time, Mr. Khrushchev himself here admits, as Mr. Burns pointed out, that there would still remain some risk of nuclear bombing and that consequently some lack of confidence in the safeguards provided by his treaty is justified. That is what it really means. In allowing that his provisions concerning aircraft do not remove the threat of aerial bombardment and that some retention of defences is sensible, does Mr. Khrushchev not, by that same token, admit that a similar danger will remain when each of the other kinds of delivery vehicle is eliminated? In other words, if some aircraft could still be used to deliver a nuclear warhead could he possibly deny that the same could be true of some rockets or some ships?

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For each of those some kind of defence ought to be provided until confidence has been built up. But once again, of course, we run into grave difficulty; for whereas there may be defences against some such aircraft attacks there is no comparable defence against the ballistic missile or the nuclear propelled submarine when they are used as carriers of nuclear weapons. Apart from the safeguards of the most complete verification there is in fact no physical defence on which we can rely, and nothing indeed, until an adequate United Nations peace force has been established, to protect us except our defence through deterrents. That is what we have to rely on in the early stages of the disarmament process.

That is one reason why the United Kingdom can never -- yes, I repeat, never -- agree to any scheme which would have to assume the abolition of all delivery vehicles in this early stage. I say "assume" because no serious attempt has been made to show how 100 per cent verification could be achieved in the first stage. If Mr. Zorin wants us to take his proposal seriously, let him explain; let him explain his verification proposals in detail and not pass them over in the glib way of which he is so fond.

I am bound to comment in that connexion also that I have many times been struck by the complete apparent lack of interest shown by the Soviet delegation in ensuring that, for instance, the United States would get rid of every one of its nuclear delivery vehicles at the same time as the Soviet Union in this first stage, as it contemplates. I wonder, does any single delegation round this table for one moment think that the Soviet Union will throw away every single one of its nuclear delivery vehicles in the first stage unless it has absolute proof that the United States is doing the same? Both Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Zorin have said that they will not take the word of the West. Why then do they show no interest in a problem which is at least as acute for them as for anyone else? I wonder.

Perhaps Mr. Zorin would answer by saying that his Government does, of course, intend to trust the Government of the United States to carry out its undertakings honestly and conscientiously. But that would accord very ill with the attitude which our Soviet colleagues have adopted so far. If Mr. Zorin were to take that line we should find it very hard to reconcile the existence of so much trust of the Western Powers' intentions where their own observance of the treaty is concerned with so much mistrust as the Soviet Union insists on showing when there is any question of allowing a few inspectors -- not necessarily United States inspectors, but a few inspectors -- to carry out adequate inspection on Soviet soil.

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Moreover, we have been regaled many times -- as we were again regaled as recently as at our last meeting by the representative of Bulgaria -- with stories of the wicked intentions of United States generals. If those stories are put forward with any seriousness, I should have thought the Soviet Union would have been very concerned indeed on this particular issue -- very concerned.

I should like here just to pick up a point from Mr. Zorin's speech on Monday when, following our Canadian colleague, he referred to the question of strategic balance between the two military blocs if all delivery vehicles had been eliminated by the end of stage I (ENDC/PV.66, p.42). Mr. Burns, as it will be recalled, has once or twice put forward some very detailed, cogent arguments in that connexion and Mr. Zorin has sought to deal with them. I do not want to intervene too much in this particular cross-current of comment, which I have studied with care, but on one occasion the United Kingdom did rather enter into the picture so I think it would be appropriate if I made some comment on that aspect. Mr. Zorin suggests that Mr. Burns had deliberately avoided, at our last meeting, mentioning the position in which United Kingdom forces would find themselves in the event of war at such a moment. I am quite sure that Mr. Burns' silence on that subject, on which Mr. Zorin remarked, was not due to any feeling that his arguments were weak on that point. In my view, they are, on the contrary, very strong indeed. But, as the United Kingdom is involved, let me very briefly summarize the position on this particular aspect of the argument as I see it.

Mr. Burns pointed out on 30 July (ENDC/PV.63, p.15) that in Mr. Zorin's list of the armed forces of the European NATO Powers he had included the armed forces of the United Kingdom, ignoring the fact that those forces would have been withdrawn to their home territories and could not reach the theatre of war except by passing over the sea -- a difficult and a time-consuming operation; and at the same meeting Mr. Zorin replied:

"... We cannot separate the United Kingdom from Europe and say that in the present circumstances the United Kingdom would not be able to participate with her troops in European affairs if there happened to be an armed conflict. I consider that to be an absolutely elementary error of general knowledge."

(ibid, p.44)

But that is not what Mr. Burns said. Mr. Burns on that occasion merely pointed out that the operation would consume much time, and that of course is the real core of the matter. We do not deny that, by requisitioning civil airliners, channel steamers

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and that sort of thing we could transport large numbers of men across the Channel within a reasonably short time. But men are of little use in modern war if they have no equipment, and the difficulties of transporting heavy military equipment, tanks, artillery, et cetera, which are always considerable, would be infinitely complicated if there were no military transport ships designed for the purpose still available.

All such ships would, in my understanding, have been eliminated under article 7 of the Soviet plan, since any vessel capable of carrying heavy tanks would certainly be capable of carrying nuclear weapons. We do not pretend that that would make it impossible for us to come to the aid of our allies, nor, I think, did Mr. Burns intimate that; but we do wish to assure Mr. Zorin that any such operation would be long and arduous. In the event of a surprise attack speed is, of course, everything, and it is extremely unlikely that an effective British force would, after the end of stage I of the Soviet plan, be capable of reaching the scene of operation in time to play a decisive part.

That is a very important point, and I must remind my colleagues round this table that it was of course that very fact, that physical fact, which led the British Government to commit itself in the years soon after the Second World War to maintain substantial forces on the mainland of Europe. Mr. Zorin no doubt will recall that a great deal of apprehension was then felt by Western European countries about aggressive Soviet military intentions which had, at that time, caused such serious disquiet to their Governments. The western European countries concerned felt that Britain would not have time to come to their aid -- that is, if it had not already substantial forces on the continent. If that was the position, then it would be much the same today after all nuclear delivery vehicles had been given up. Therefore I can say to Mr. Zorin that in fact that part of his argument does not stand up to critical inspection.

However I know also, in this connexion, that in his criticisms Mr. Zorin has still not attempted to deal with two major points raised by Mr. Burns in his intervention on 30 July. My colleagues may recall that I commented at that time, right at the end of the meeting, in the following terms:

"I was struck by the interesting analogies he Mr. Zorin drew in relation to the NATO Powers, but it was what he did not say rather than what he did say that impressed me. As I listened to Mr. Burns, two of his most powerful arguments seemed to me to be the strong advantage of a single State with a

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large number of troops under its own command, which must have very substantial military advantages, and the massive numbers of Soviet tanks. Neither of those was referred to by our Soviet colleague. No doubt he will explain their relevance to us on some future occasion." (ENDC/PV.63, p.52)

In spite of that invitation, so far as I am aware, Mr. Zorin has not faced up to this problem at the present time; and I am still waiting to hear from him on it. I do not understand why he is so coy in relation to the matter of those massive conventional forces, particularly heavy tanks, to which we referred.

I am afraid that these remarks which, after hearing Mr. Zorin's last statement, I felt obliged to make have lead me a little way from the main subject of my statement this morning -- namely, an examination of the grounds on which Mr. Zorin chose to attack our own contributions to this discussion on nuclear delivery vehicles. Before I conclude, however, I should like to point out that, much as I regret the lines along which that attack was directed, what disturbed me much more was the fact that he chose to make such an attack at all. From the outset of this Conference our Soviet colleagues have opposed any suggestions which have been made, whether by the Western Powers, by the Swedish or Brazilian delegations or by any other of the non-aligned delegations, to get down to matters of hard fact. When they agreed to the present discussion of certain subjects in depth, we had hoped that they had overcome their misgivings. But the fact that, with the tabling of our very first paper, Mr. Zorin should have shown himself to be so much on the defensive suggests that there has been no important change in the Soviet position.

In my view "discussion in depth" means frank consideration of such difficulties as exist and confront us. If our papers raise no difficulties, Mr. Zorin blames us for their simplicity. If, on the other hand, they raise difficulties, he immediately takes refuge in the same old emotional slogans and superficialities. It would seem therefore that Mr. Zorin, despite having agreed as co-Chairman to a discussion of these subjects in depth, is trying to drive us away from any such thing. So keen is he to do that that he goes so far as to request us to submit no further papers (ENDC/PV.65, p.47) -- a request which we shall of course ignore.

My understanding of our work is that in the first part of the session before the recess we concentrated most on expounding the two plans and on saying what method of disarmament each of us wished to carry out in each stage. Now that we are endeavouring to consider these matters in depth my view is that we should be talking not only about what we want to do but also how we propose to do it. It is the duty of each side to show, if called on, how it would carry out its proposals in a realistic manner.

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All this causes me to pause and to wonder why our Soviet colleague is not more forthcoming on this. He is an extremely intelligent man. I have the greatest respect for his ability. He agreed to the detailed discussion of these issues of substance; and yet he has made no serious attempt -- none whatever -- to analyse the difficulties that confront us on this very important subject.

His first speech on this item on 1 August (ENDC/PV.64, pp. 13 et seq.) was, if he will forgive me for saying so, an unhappy and unconvincing repetition of the generalizations which he used on the subject in our first session. His second speech on the subject, on 3 August (ENDC/PV.65, pp. 37 et seq.) was mainly an attack on others who had presumed to treat the subject seriously and to try to analyse some of our difficulties -- for that was all we were seeking to do. His third speech on the subject, on 6 August (ENDC/PV.66), was another example of his determination, by violent criticism of others, to avoid serious examination of his own proposals.

Those tactics --- and I regret to say this, but I must be frank with my colleagues --- make it impossible for me not to wonder whether Mr. Zorin is acting under instructions to try to prevent effective detailed discussion, just as he has prevented the setting up of working parties or sub-committees on particular subjects. That is well known to every representative at this table. Is it possible that he and his Government know that the Soviet draft will not stand up to detailed discussion? Is it possible that it might be shown to be merely a propaganda document designed to put forward those things which are known to have a strong appeal to all men throughout the world but without any serious attempt to find means of carrying them out? Is it that he knows that detailed investigation will show the unreality of the Soviet proposals, and of none more than of his proposal to eliminate 100 per cent of nuclear delivery vehicles in the first stage? Is he not aware that there can be no possible way of ensuring effective 100 per cent verification of that measure in stage I without allowing inspectors such freedom as to lay his remaining weapons open to what he himself describes as "espionage". I hope that is not the interpretation that should be put on his actions.

He can convince me -- he can convince me very easily -- if he will attempt the same serious approach to our problems as both the Western and unaligned representatives have tried to adopt, and particularly as the West has tried to adopt in its discussion of this item since we embarked on it last week. That is the sort of objective discussion that I want to return to. But no one who either heard or read Mr. Zorin's speeches last Monday or Friday will, I hope, feel that I am being unfair if today I have felt it necessary firmly and frankly to rebut his criticisms and to appeal for a more constructive attitude from now on.

Mr. HAJEK (Czechoslovakia): Like a number of our colleagues here, the Czechoslovak Delegation has followed with great interest the discussion of item 5(b) of our agreed procedure of work (ENDC/52) and considers the question of the liquidation of the means of delivering nuclear weapons to be a key problem, not only of the first stage but also of the entire agreement on general and complete disarmament.

Our attitude to this problem is determined by what we think the aim of the first stage of general and complete disarmament should be. In the course of our discussion we have heard on many occasions in this Committee, as well as outside, the urgent appeal made to us by nations, by leading representatives of nations and by prominent personalities from all over the world, as well as by many ordinary people, to put an immediate end to the danger of a nuclear war. It seems that on that the majority of delegations in our Committee are in agreement. The logical consequence of that appeal is the requirement of the earliest possible agreement -- which means as early as the first stage -- on such measures as would prevent the unleashing of a nuclear war.

At present there are only two alternatives to the attainment of that aim. The first is the complete liquidation of nuclear weapons in the first stage, which the countries of NATO, as is well known, have rejected. The second is the liquidation of all means of delivering nuclear weapons. No one has proved up to now in our discussions that there is any other alternative. There are, of course, objections that these measures are much too sweeping and are beyond the pale of normal measures. However, nuclear war represents such an enormous danger that partial measures are not enough to cope with it; taking into consideration the existence of stockpiles of tens of thousands of nuclear and thermonuclear bombs, and the great number of nuclear vehicles of all categories and types, any percentage reduction of those vehicles is altogether insufficient. It can neither represent any contribution to the realization of the disarmament process nor provide an answer to what nations expect from our discussions with regard both to the prevention of a nuclear war and to greater security in the world.

That is why our delegation cannot accept the view that the difference between the disarmament measures of the first stage contained in the Soviet draft (ENDC/2 and Add.1) and those contained in the United States drafts (ENDC/30 and Add. 1 and 2) is merely one of quantity and not quality, as some of our Western colleagues have asserted in our discussions. If the objective is the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war



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there is a substantial difference between real, effective disarmament measures leading to the attainment of that objective and measures which, in this respect, are only symbolical and formal.

Some time ago we asked the United States delegation whether it considered the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war to be the aim of the first stage, or whether it had set some other aim for that stage. So far we have not had a clear answer. We cannot but have the impression that the United States and its allies have not made the prevention of the possibility of a nuclear war the objective to be attained -- not only in the first stage of general and complete disarmament, but presumably in the entire process of its realization as well. If that is not so, it is up to them to prove the contrary.

Permit me now to deal with the arguments we have heard from the delegations of the NATO countries against the complete liquidation of nuclear delivery vehicles in stage I. The first series of arguments was to the effect that liquidation of all delivery vehicles would place the countries of NATO in an unequal position in the field of conventional weapons as compared with the countries of the Warsaw Treaty. I do not intend to dwell on those arguments, because their absolute untenability has been convincingly proved at previous meetings by the delegations of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries on the basis of facts as well as of authoritative Western sources, and so far has not been refuted.

With regard to conventional forces, the delegations of the United States or of its allies may propose, if they deem it necessary, an even more substantial reduction of armed forces in stage I than they have been willing to accept up to now. There is one side of their argument on which I would like to dwell for a moment, and that relates to what the representative of Canada said once again in trying to defend the untenable position of the Western delegations' argument, concerning the balance of power in stage I. He dismissed as incomplete (ENDC/PV.66, p.19) the few remarks we had made on that question on 30 July (ENDC/PV.63, pp. 28 et seq.) Of course he did that without trying to disprove them on their merits. Our remarks concerned precisely the line of contact between the two military groupings in Central Europe about which the representative of Canada spoke at that meeting when he tried to point out the resulting military disadvantages for the West.

It seems to our delegation that we who live precisely in that part of Europe, precisely on that line of contact, have some authority to speak on the subject, and what we did at the sixty-third meeting was to draw attention to many other factors

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involved in, for instance, the possible concentration of troops for aggressive purposes or the possible rendering of military assistance from countries on either side nearest to those in the area of contact. In that way we tried to put in a proper light the allegations of the Western delegations about alleged military disadvantages for the West. We pointed out that we cannot say that all the troops of the Soviet Union and its allies would stand on the line of contact in Central Europe opposite the troops of the German Federal Republic and its nearest allies alone, as the representative of Canada was trying to demonstrate. In fact, in conditions of realization of the first stage of general and complete disarmament as proposed by the Soviet draft -- and I think we cannot consider it in any way other than within that context -- the troops of the German Federal Republic would stand opposite the troops of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the German Democratic Republic.

At first glance, it is clear that it is impossible to speak about any superiority on the part of the socialist countries on that line of contact which the representative of Canada considered to be the main line of contact between the two military groupings. On the questions of distance and of communications, both sides, as was proved, would have to cope with these matters in such a situation. Of course, any genuine measure of disarmament is bound to entail an equal degree of limitation of the military potential of all the countries concerned. On the other hand, we cannot disregard the main advantage which would result from the implementation of the measures provided for in the Soviet draft treaty, not only for the countries in the area of contact in Central Europe, but all over the world -- namely greater security based upon the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war.

The second main argument of the delegations of the countries of NATO is that it is impossible to differentiate between nuclear delivery vehicles and certain conventional armaments. I think this argument was especially dealt with by the representative of the United States, Mr. Stelle, who, at the meeting on 1 August, asserted that:

"... despite extensive study the United States has been unable to find a way of distinguishing between nuclear delivery vehicles on the one hand and certain conventional armaments on the other." (ENDC/PV.64, p.31)

What is the real situation? The necessity of classifying nuclear delivery vehicles as a special category of weapons stems from their very nature and purpose in modern warfare. As is well known, the basic feature of these vehicles is that they are

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inseparably connected with the use of nuclear weapons which are, qualitatively, new kinds of weapons in their effect. As a result of that fact, and in view of the technical qualities and capabilities of the vehicles, their use alone can enable even strategic tasks to be carried out in war. In other words, their existence even at much reduced levels will always entail the possibility of an outbreak of nuclear war.

In the past the United States authorities were apparently well aware of the patent difference between the category of nuclear delivery vehicles and that of other armaments. It is not fortuitous that they agreed to list nuclear delivery vehicles as a special category of weapons in paragraph 3(c) of the joint statement of agreed principles by the Soviet Union and the United States (ENDC/5), a well-known document, in the agreed article 1, paragraph 2(c) of part 1 of the treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/40/Rev.1) as well as in paragraph 5(b) which we are now discussing of the agreed procedure of work of the Committee (ENDC/52). Therefore, we have been greatly surprised to hear the delegations of the United States and its allies now speak of the impossibility of distinguishing between the categories and types of nuclear delivery vehicles and other armaments; why are they trying to confuse the whole problem?

Two kinds of nuclear delivery vehicles exist. The first -- such as, for instance, intercontinental ballistic missiles -- were designed exclusively for delivering nuclear weapons. There is no doubt about that even among the representatives of the countries of NATO. The second category consists of weapons that have a dual capability -- an ability to serve as either nuclear delivery vehicles or conventional armaments. As was pointed out by the representative of the Soviet Union (ENDC/PV.65, p.41), the problem of differentiating between these two types of weapons, or between weapons within the so-called "twilight zone" of which Mr. Stelle spoke (ENDC/PV.64, p.34), does not exist for the delegations of the socialist countries. All potential nuclear delivery vehicles must be destroyed in the first stage in order to achieve real elimination of the danger of a nuclear war. There is no other alternative in fact.

The determination of the relevant categories and types of weapons will not be such a difficult problem. Of course, it will be a problem which will take some time and which will take a great deal of work, but it is not an insurmountable problem. The delegations of the socialist countries are also in favour of specifying the types

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of nuclear delivery vehicles in every category -- in due time, however, after the basic agreement has been reached on the solution of the question of the elimination of nuclear weapons as a whole. There is no sense in establishing such a list before a political decision of this kind has been taken. It can only be done after the political decision has been made. Likewise, the determination of types of weapons which can in no way be used as nuclear delivery vehicles will present no problem. A list of such weapons -- as the lists of the different types of nuclear delivery vehicles -- could constitute an annex to the treaty.

Finally, the third main argument used by the delegations of the countries of NATO against the total elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles in stage I is the allegation that the Soviet draft treaty does not provide for an effective control and that such measures cannot be controlled at all. We cannot accept the basis of such an allegation adduced by the delegations of the Western countries. Articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Soviet draft lay down the principle that all the anticipated measures relating to the liquidation of nuclear delivery vehicles and relevant facilities or to their transmission for peaceful uses together with the dismantling of all plants or parts thereof and their conversion to peaceful uses will be subject to on-site -- I repeat, on-site -- control by inspectors of the international disarmament organization. A 100 per cent elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles and their production will be accompanied by 100 per cent control. In that way the Soviet draft treaty complies fully with the basic requirement of article 6 of the joint statement of agreed principles (ENDC/5) that the extent of control should be commensurate with the extent of the disarmament measures carried out.

In connexion with this question of control in stage I of the Soviet draft we cannot let pass in silence the opinion expressed by the representative of Canada during his intervention of 6 August. He said:

"... the inspectors of the international disarmament organization would not be an infallible guarantee that the peace would not be threatened or broken."

(ENDC/PV.66, p.22)

That of course applies to the Soviet proposal. The opinion on control expressed in the quoted words puts in question the entire purpose and meaning of any control and is, I would say, in some contrast to the attitude of the Western delegations, which have so often emphasized the importance of control. Scepticism with regard to the question of control in general also of course applies to the measures of control

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contained in the United States draft, because in that draft too the institution of inspectors, whose general capability of ensuring the implementation of disarmament measures is now within the logic of the words of the representative of Canada, is being questioned. As we have asked, what harmony is there between this scepticism in regard to control and the emphasis put on it by the Western delegations? What is the logic in asserting that the measures contained in the Soviet draft are uncontrollable whereas the opposite is said to be true of the United States draft?

This double yardstick applied to control in general is yet another proof that, in regard to the Soviet draft, the actual basis for scepticism on control on the part of the Western Powers is their opposition to the implementation of the measures proposed therein. Apparently it is even something more than mere opposition to these measures, because the representative of Canada stated:

"Inspectors of the international disarmament organization, according to the Soviet Union plan, would have no means to oblige a host country to let them stay and do their duty. They would have no force to protect them. We know that inspectors in municipal or national employment can only report on what they see or otherwise learn. When they see something which is being done contrary to the law it is not they -- the inspectors -- who enforce the law but the judges and the police. (ENDC/PV.66, p.22)

That would mean that the international disarmament organization and its organs, in the sense and logic of what has been said by the representative of Canada, should enjoy a kind of super-State position and impose their will on the controlled party, instead of simply ascertaining facts as is the sense of the function of inspectors. Of course no sovereign State can agree to such a concept of international control, which is in flagrant contradiction of paragraph 6 of the joint statement. That is all the more so when one takes into consideration what the representative of Canada said, namely, that the Western Powers will not destroy their delivery vehicles until after they have assured themselves that the Soviet Union has first completely destroyed its own.

We have repeatedly heard two kinds of objections from the delegations of the countries of NATO concerning control. First of all they allege that it will be necessary to ensure the prevention of clandestine production of nuclear weapons and of weapons hidden "under the jacket", as the United Kingdom delegation put it once (ENDC/PV.50, p.8) -- and the representative of the United Kingdom has been dwelling on this problem this morning (Supra, p.8).

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With regard to the first objection the controlled cessation of production of nuclear delivery vehicles envisaged in the Soviet draft provides a satisfactory guarantee that no clandestine production will take place. Representatives will surely recall that the delegations of the socialist countries have on many occasions pointed out that the production and assembly of nuclear delivery vehicles and their components are so exacting and specialized from the technical point of view that it is quite improbable that such activities could escape the notice of strict international control. Incidentally, this assertion of ours was -- with regard to rockets -- fully confirmed in paragraph 13 of the document submitted by the United Kingdom delegation on 1 August (ENDC/53).

Now let us consider the possibility of hiding nuclear delivery vehicles -- the problem that has been mentioned regarding weapons "hidden under the jacket". We have already pointed out that this problem is an artificial one raised by the Western delegations and that it has been unnecessarily dramatized. It is not so insurmountable as has been alleged by them, and as was alleged once more today in the speech of the representative of the United Kingdom.

When, some time in the future, the participating governments sign the treaty embracing the entire programme of general and complete disarmament -- and we hope that that future time may not be so remote -- then an entirely new situation will arise in the world in which we could hardly expect that any party might try to circumvent the assumed obligations in such catastrophic ways and with such catastrophic consequences as the representative of the United Kingdom spoke about today. Moreover, not only until the very end of the process of general and complete disarmament but even thereafter, the parties to the treaty will have sufficient means to enforce the fulfilment of the obligations assumed by any party violating the treaty.

However, even if, for argument's sake, we admit the possibility, which the representative of the United Kingdom emphasized this morning, of hiding a limited number of nuclear delivery vehicles, with the corresponding amount of nuclear weapons themselves, prior to the beginning of the process of general and complete disarmament, it will not and cannot give the expected advantages to the violating party. It is difficult to imagine, and no one has tried to assert during our negotiations, that any aggressor could wage or win a war with a few nuclear delivery vehicles at his disposal. In view of the other provisions and measures and the implementation of general and complete disarmament -- and we must again stress the content of all the

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measures proposed in the Soviet draft treaty -- the violating party would in the first stage be left almost without the possibility of using the concealed vehicles effectively. The sufficiently speedy rate of implementation of disarmament measures would provide additional guarantees of the irreversibility and of the impossibility of interrupting the process of general and complete disarmament.

As may be seen from what I have said, the delegations of the NATO countries are incapable of proving, even by military, technical and control arguments, that the complete liquidation of all nuclear delivery vehicles as early as the first stage is impossible and could not be controlled. It follows, then, that the obstacle to the solution of the principal problem of stage I -- that is, the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war -- lies outside the three spheres of argument mentioned above; it lies elsewhere; it lies in the political field, in the unwillingness of our partners from the Western countries to carry out substantial disarmament measures as early as in stage I and, above all, to eliminate the possibility of launching a nuclear war. On the contrary, everything seems to indicate that the Western Powers are trying to retain precisely that possibility. The fact that the delegations of the Western countries are so stubbornly attempting to put nuclear delivery vehicles into the same category as other armaments and thereby give them the character of conventional armaments can only corroborate this view.

We should welcome a reappraisal by the delegations of the NATO countries of their attitude on the question of nuclear delivery vehicles, which is the most important measure in stage I of general and complete disarmament. Our discussions require that both sides exert endeavours to reach agreement and try their best to meet each other half way, thereby facilitating progress. It is a fact, however, that whereas in our resumed discussions the delegations of the Soviet Union and the other Socialist countries have in several cases gone far to meet the other side the position of the delegations of the NATO countries has remained in principle the same. The sooner the delegations of the Western countries realize that fact and also exert efforts to reach mutually acceptable solutions, the sooner will be achieved the progress in our work which world public opinion so impatiently awaits.

Mr. CASTRO (Brazil); I am instructed by my Government to acquaint the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament with the terms of the official note issued by the Government of Brazil last Monday, 6 August 1962. It reads:

(Mr. Castro, Brazil)

"It has been Brazil's invariable stand to oppose the explosion of nuclear bombs; whichever the Power resorting to it, without ignoring the preoccupations any of the Powers may have with the problems of their own security.

"The Government of Brazil considers that the explosion of nuclear weapons is not justified, as this adversely affects the interests of all mankind. Thus, on taking note of the resumption of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union, the Government of Brazil cannot fail to express its regret and apprehensions.

"The Government of Brazil reiterates on this occasion its formal disapproval of the policies at present followed by the nuclear Powers in this regard, because it considers such policies to be contrary to the interests of international peace and security and to show a clear disregard of the recommendations contained in Resolution 1648 (XVI) of the General Assembly of the United Nations."

Mr. LALL (India): At the end of our last meeting, against the pressure of time, the delegation of India made a few remarks to express its views on the question of a test ban agreement between the nuclear Powers (ENDC/PV.66, p.50). We feel obliged to enlarge briefly on our position in that matter. We are glad that the representative of Brazil has thought fit to refer to it again. If I may say so, a curious position is developing in regard to nuclear tests. The sense of urgency regarding the stopping of nuclear tests is, curiously enough, being displayed much more by the non-aligned countries, the countries that are not testing, than by the nuclear Powers. Perhaps that is in the nature of things. After all, those who are testing nuclear weapons presumably feel that they have some justification for doing so. But at the same time those same countries do say every now and again that nuclear tests are contrary to their own interests and even contrary to considerations of security in their own countries. Their leaders tell us that the development of nuclear weapons will lessen national security. At the same time, for reasons which are not at all clear and which, in the light of such circumstances, would be difficult if not impossible to follow; the perfecting of weapons of mass destruction continues. It is in these circumstances that we feel obliged to refer again to the matter.

First I would like to say that we are very glad to have been informed by the Chairman that the two co-Chairmen are talking together about the possibility of a test ban agreement. We hope that those conversations will proceed to a positive conclusion. In that connexion the delegation of India feels it necessary to point



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out that soon after the eight non-aligned countries in this Conference presented document ENDC/28 of 16 April -- namely, a memorandum suggesting certain principles on which a test ban agreement could be reached -- both sides told us that they would accept that document as a basis for negotiations.

I do not have to draw attention to your own statements, Mr. Chairman, or the statements of the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, reiterating that agreement on the utilization of the eight-nation memorandum as a basis for negotiation. I would refer only to the report of this Committee to the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations on the work of the first part of this session, in which it was stated that:

"... on April 19, 1962 .... the Soviet Government expressed its willingness to consider proposals set out in the memorandum as a basis for further negotiations. The United Kingdom and the United States accepted the Joint Memorandum as one of the bases for negotiations." (ENDC/42, p.4)

We know of no other basis which has been accepted by both sides. If another basis could be accepted by both sides we should be very happy, but we should like to draw attention to the fact that both sides stand committed -- stand committed -- to negotiate on the basis of that memorandum while, of course, seeking other possibilities of negotiation, undoubtedly; but they do stand committed to negotiate on that memorandum. That is what they have told us. And it is not only we who draw attention to that commitment: I am sure that it is a commitment which the whole world will remember, and to which people will refer -- on both sides.

Since the time when the two sides thought fit to accept the joint memorandum as a basis of negotiation there have been various scientific developments, all of which have reaffirmed and strengthened the joint memorandum of the eight nations. Therefore it follows, does it not, that if the two sides could accept the joint memorandum when they did -- that is before they presumably knew about the results of the new scientific developments -- they are bound now to find themselves much more willing to negotiate on the basis of that joint memorandum. In fact it would seem, on the basis of both published -- popularly published -- scientific views and scientific views which have not been published but of which we are aware, and which I will not quote because I do not wish to embarrass either side, that in fact the joint memorandum errs, if anything, on the side of caution, which is perhaps all to the good.

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I should like to draw attention in this connexion to two brief quotations from The Observer of London. The first is from an article by the science correspondent of The Observer, dated 22 July, which ends:

"In this case a reasonably effective detection system which would not need any on-site inspection is within reach now, although there would still have to be some method of settling disputes if one country accused another of violating the ban."

Then I would like to draw attention to views which were attributed to Dr. Baath, a Swedish seismologist and the Director of the Seismological Institute of the University of Uppsala, which appeared in The Observer for 5 August. Dr. Baath said that:

"Some uncertainty -- calling for occasional inspections -- would remain, especially if tests were conducted in earthquake areas or if underground explosions could be deliberately muffled."

"But with further research it would probably be impossible to make test explosions without the danger of detection."

What I am doing is drawing attention to the fact that science is moving in the direction of the kind of arrangements which were suggested in the joint memorandum. I should like to draw attention, in a general way, to the fact that the new long-range detection and identification systems which have recently been applied successfully are known now to be superior to the close system of control posts which was suggested in the report of the 1958 Committee of Experts (EXP/NUC/28), which had been the basis of the proposals put forward by one side or the other in the early stages. Not only does the new long range detection system have an effect on the number of control posts: it also affects the whole subject of on-site inspection. I will not attempt at the moment to go into detail as to how it does so, because that is well known to both sides. What I want to say is that those new arrangements all confirm the validity of the eight nation memorandum.

It has been said here and in the Sub-Committee, and rightly so, that in the process of negotiation there would be vast gaps to be filled in, and this was based on a statement made by the representative of Ethiopia (ENDC/PV.24, pp. 5 et seq.) when he introduced the memorandum on behalf of the eight nations. Yes, of course there would be gaps to be filled in, but they would be gaps of detail, not of principle. It has never been suggested by any of the eight nations that negotiations were needed to alter the principles of the memorandum at all. I should like to make that

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absolutely clear. It has never been so suggested. Those principles stand not only endorsed but also assured of continuing validity by the scientific achievements of the recent past. Therefore it is the view of the delegation of India that if both sides want to reach agreement on the basis of the memorandum they can do so, and we think, with all respect, that they should reach such agreement and that they should reach it urgently.

We should like to end this part of our statement by saying that we cannot ourselves find the present development of weapons of mass destruction to be of a character which is blessed, or indeed authorized, by any philosophy, religion or ethical position which either side seems to support. I am not very well acquainted with the philosophy of Marxism, I must admit, but I cannot see how a materialist philosophy could support a development which destroys materialism itself, and that is what the present development of weapons will do. It will destroy any philosophy, any religion, any ethical idea, any basis of human life that any individual or group of individuals subscribes to.

We would appeal to you, Mr. Chairman, in your discussions with Mr. Zorin, to reach agreement on a test ban, and to remember that the eight-nation memorandum stands, and stands more strongly today than when the two sides accepted it some four months ago.

I should like now to pass to another aspect, because other matters have been discussed recently in our plenary meetings and we feel it our duty to make a few comments on them. I should like to turn to the United States document (ENDC/30/Add.1) of 6 August 1962 which contains amendments to stage I, section A, on armaments in the matter of production. I would say that we welcome that paper, Mr. Chairman. We welcome the effort which your delegation has made to move forward towards a view which, we think, will be constructive in the field of general and complete disarmament regarding the important question of the production of weapons. Some members of your delegation have been good enough to tell me informally that, in a degree, these new proposals are responsive to and have taken into account certain suggestions which we ourselves made early in our examination of this matter on behalf of the delegation of India. It will be recalled that we did suggest then that neither plan, in our view, attached sufficient importance to the need to arrest the production of armaments at an early stage. Before I come to making certain suggestions here regarding production, which would be in elaboration of the general views which we expressed at that stage, and once again later in our discussions, I should like to raise certain questions on the paper which you, Mr. Chairman, have been good enough to distribute.

(Mr. Lall, India)

I should like to ask whether, when you refer in paragraph 2(c) -- which you would put in in substitution for the present text of paragraph 3 of the relevant stage of your plan -- to the testing and production of new types of armaments being prohibited, you are referring to the testing and production of all new types of armaments. Or are you referring only to conventional armaments? Or are you referring only to certain conventional armaments? The phrase which you have used is wide enough to refer to all types of armaments, and we would express the hope that that is the case; that it means in fact that the testing and production of all new types of armaments would be prohibited, whether conventional or nuclear.

My second question arises out of paragraph 2(a), which begins by saying:

"Production of all armaments listed in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 1 above would be limited to agreed allowances ..."

My question is this: would it be possible for your delegation, Mr. Chairman, to consider altering that to read: "Production of all conventional armaments would be limited to agreed allowances ..."?

My third question concerns paragraph 2(d) in which you state that the expansion of facilities for the production of existing types of armaments and the construction or equipping of facilities for the production of new types of armaments would be prohibited. Does that mean all existing types of armaments, nuclear and conventional? We would be happy to be informed about that.

Now I should like to turn to paragraphs 2(e) and (f). Paragraph 2(e) says that the flight testing of missiles would be limited to agreed annual quotas. Paragraph 2(c), as I pointed out, said that the testing of new types of armaments would be prohibited. Would it not be possible, then, to prohibit also the flight testing of missiles? Would that raise extreme difficulties for anyone? In fact, it would, of course, save a lot of money if both sides were to stop flight testing their missiles. At any rate, I do not see why it should be necessary to continue the flight testing of missiles.

Finally, paragraph 2(f) deals with verification and says the following:

"In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the international disarmament organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing measures were not conducted at undeclared locations."

(Mr. Lall, India)

My first reaction is that this paragraph is acceptable in terms of the kind of verification arrangements which it sets forth, and we are glad to see that paragraph there.

Recently, I stated in general terms that the delegation of India was in favour of the total cessation of the production of all armaments in the very first stage as being the most logical position in a programme on general and complete disarmament; and we were glad to see that there was some support for that view by delegations which had theretofore supported the present terms of the Soviet draft plan, which do not conform to our suggestion. We hope that both sides will be able to accept our general position on the cessation of all production of armaments in stage I, with the possible exception -- and I say only possible exception because even this is a matter which, we believe, deserves further consideration -- of certain allowances in respect of spare parts. We should like to come back to those details on an appropriate occasion later.

I wish to state even more clearly how we would envisage this matter of production. We would, first, stop production of all armaments in stage I. Secondly, the dismantling and conversion of armament factories would be carried out under the control of the international disarmament organization. Thirdly, continuing checks on converted factories -- that is to say, those factories which had been converted to peaceful purposes -- would be made in accordance with arrangements which would be set out in the agreed annexes on verification.

Of course, if there are further checks agreed on, some assurance against clandestine and illegal activities which are not permitted and which go against the disarmament already undertaken, those, too, would become relevant in a general sense. But these would be the three measures which we would think were directly germane to this question of production, and we hope that these suggestions can be considered by both sides.

Now I would like to turn to a third point, that is the question of paragraph 5(b) of the document which we are discussing. I must say I feel it my duty, Mr. Chairman, to draw attention to a statement made by your colleague and my good friend, Mr. Stelle, to which I must take some exception. Mr. Stelle said on 1 August, when he was talking about the question of nuclear delivery vehicles:

"First, it seems to us that both sides have as an ultimate objective the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles to the point where nuclear war would be no longer feasible." (ENDC/PV.64, p.33)

(Mr. Lall, India)

With great respect, we do not agree with that view. We cannot agree that the ultimate objective is the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles to the point where nuclear war would be no longer feasible. I think we must all agree that, in this matter, we must stay with the terms of document ENDC/5 -- which was negotiated and agreed between the two delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States of America originally, and was then endorsed unanimously (A/RES/1722 (XVI)) by the General Assembly of the United Nations -- which, in this connexion, says that there must be elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction.

Although I mention this point, I hope I am right in thinking that that particular statement made by Mr. Stelle was, in fact, not necessarily his own view, because he stated on 3 August, and we were very glad that he did:

"We are quite willing to highlight the necessity and desirability of eliminating all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction along with everything else." (ENDC/PV.65, p.49)

Those two statements do not entirely agree with each other, but I take it that the second statement does represent the position of the delegation of the United States, and I raise the point because we feel that we must stay with that particular position and there must be no misunderstanding on this issue. What I am doing is merely trying to clear up a misunderstanding, and I should be grateful indeed if the United States delegation would clear up the remaining misunderstanding on this issue, because I feel there should be none.

Now, what are we to do with these vehicles of delivery of nuclear weapons? We are told by document ENDC/5 that we must eliminate them. I suggest that our first duty is to maintain that position without wavering: that these means of delivery must be eliminated. There must be no getting away from that position.

But Mr. Stelle quite rightly said that one must define what is a means of delivery of nuclear weapons, and he suggested that there was a large "twilight zone" (ENDC/PV.64, p.34). Mr. Zorin said that he did not agree that there was any twilight zone. He said that there were, first, those means of delivery which were specifically built to deliver nuclear weapons and, secondly, there were means of delivery which were built in such a way that they could carry either a nuclear or a conventional warhead. He said that in his statement of 3 August (ENDC/PV.65, p.41). He went on to say that all dual-purpose weapons should be included in means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

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Mr. Stelle took the view that if that were done there would have to be almost complete disarmament in the very first stage of the plan because there was such a large area of dual-purpose weapons. Mr. Zorin, however, said that the great majority of artillery systems etc. were not fitted, and could not easily be fitted, for shooting off nuclear warheads, and he also, later, said that one could not shoot a nuclear bomb from a passenger liner because a passenger liner did not have the instruments for doing so. What I want to draw attention to here is that apparently -- I say this with hesitation because I do not have enough information -- on the face of the two statements there has been greater technical progress in this matter in the United States than in the Soviet Union. Apparently, now, almost all United States weapons can carry bonbons, or nuclear warheads, or conventional warheads, just as the commander or the authorized person might wish.

So here is a situation in which developing technology is creating more and more difficulties for us and we, of course, have to face the fact that developing technology will create more and more difficulties as we go along. How is this matter to be dealt with? We would suggest for the consideration of both sides that it might be dealt with in three steps; I am not talking about stages of our disarmament plan, but on the basis of three pegs, as it were.

One is that we should, as I have said, maintain unwaveringly the position that all means of delivery of mass destruction are to be eliminated. That is one. There should be no getting around that by saying: "Well, what is a means of delivering weapons of mass destruction?" "What is this?", and "What is that?".

It is too late, I would submit, for these original questions to be raised in that form, but I think that they are relevant in a certain sense. Therefore I would suggest that the second peg is that the two sides agree to draw up a list of those types of weapons which should be classified as means of delivery, and that the elimination should be directed to those types of weapons. We have heard today from the representative of Czechoslovakia, if I am not mistaken, that in due time such a list could be drawn up. I hope I am not misrepresenting him: I believe I am not. Well, we are not prescribing when this list should be drawn up, but the second point, in our view, should be that it should be drawn up.

The third and very contentious question remains when and how those weapons are to be eliminated. In our view, in deciding when and how those weapons should be eliminated, we must assure ourselves that our arrangements for their elimination are

(Mr. Lall, India)

responsive to the emphasis which is contained in the joint statement (ENDC/5) on the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction including the means of their delivery. There is an emphasis on that matter in the document; there is an emphasis on weapons of mass destruction, and I would submit that no plan that we could accept finally could appropriately exclude that emphasis. How that emphasis should actually be given in the plan which I hope we will finally accept, we will not at this moment suggest; we will restrain ourselves. But we hope that the two co-Chairmen in discussing this matter will take into account the emphasis which has been placed on this particular issue by the agreed principles which your delegation, Mr. Chairman, and the delegation of the Soviet Union negotiated, and which made it possible for us to go further into this question now.

The CHAIRMAN (United States): Speaking in my capacity as the representative of the United States I should like to make a few remarks. I shall reply in detail later to the comments which have been made this morning by the representative of India with respect to the document on production (ENDC/30/Add.1 which we have circulated. As I am sure he and all the other representatives are aware, those provisions have of course to fit into other parts of our treaty. I would draw his attention to page 8 of our draft outline treaty (ENDC/30) where, in section C, under the heading Nuclear Weapons, we provide that

"a. The Parties to the treaty would halt the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons."

In paragraph 4 of that same section of our draft treaty outline we talk about the non-transfer of nuclear weapons, and in paragraph 5, on page 10, it is provided that

"a. If an agreement prohibiting nuclear weapons test explosions and providing for effective international control had come into force prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, such agreement would become an annex to the Treaty, and all the Parties to the Treaty would be bound by the obligations specified in the agreement."

There are other provisions in our draft treaty for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons; and, of course when they have been reduced to zero there is no possibility of their further use. However, as I say, I shall reply in more detail later to the other points raised by the representative of India. I shall not reply today to his other points on nuclear testing, because we plan to have a meeting of the nuclear test ban Sub-Committee tomorrow and the provisional verbatim record of that meeting will be available to all representatives on Friday.



(The Chairman, United States)

Let me say however that I would take with a good many grains of salt a large number of the articles currently appearing in newspapers about the extent of scientific progress in this field. Many of the countries represented here have done very distinguished research in that field; and the United States, as representatives know, has spent an enormous amount of time and money on project Vela, the sole purpose of which was to advance the art of detection of nuclear explosions.

There has been considerable progress made in the field of detection. But the advance in the field of detection must not be confused with the advance in the field of identification -- in which there has been very little progress. Nor must one overlook the very important factor of location because under this new system of reducing the 180 control posts around the world to something like 80, which we are about to propose, it may well be that the problem of location will become somewhat more difficult.

However, let me say that three of our Governments have been represented here since 1958. It may well be said that we should have concluded a nuclear test ban a lot earlier -- and perhaps we should have done so. But when we came back to Geneva last March we had a list of requirements which the Soviet Union had given us, saying that if we met those requirements at that time it was prepared to conclude a nuclear test ban treaty. I submit that in the draft treaty (ENDC/9) which the United Kingdom and the United States proposed, with various amendments, we more than met all of the requirements listed by the Soviet Union at that time. I shall not say anything more about that now. But let me make it clear that, as we have said, the United States welcomes the very constructive nature of the eight-Power memorandum (ENDC/28) and accepts it as one of the bases of negotiations.

I shall say nothing more about nuclear tests, because we shall make a considered and more detailed statement on that subject at the meeting of the Sub-Committee tomorrow, and it will be available to representatives on Friday. As I have said, my co-Chairman and I will then, in consultation with the United Kingdom delegation, decide whether we need a further meeting of the Sub-Committee. Thereafter we shall be prepared to recommend an early date when the item could be raised in the plenary Committee.

In accordance with the recommendations by the co-Chairmen concerning the procedure of work (ENDC/52) adopted by the Committee at its sixtieth meeting on 24 July, the Committee has devoted a substantial part of three plenary meetings to a discussion of

(The Chairman, United States)

sub-paragraph 5(a), entitled "Basic obligations concerning the measures of disarmament, verification and maintenance of international peace and security in the first stage and the time limits for their implementation".

During the Committee's deliberations working drafts were submitted by the delegations of the Peoples' Republic of Bulgaria (ENDC/L.17 and Rev.1) and the United States (ENDC/L.18). Certain suggestions of a specific nature were also made by the representative of India on 30 July (ENDC/PV.63, pp.6, 8, 9).

Following referral by the Committee to the co-Chairmen of sub-paragraph 5(a), the two co-Chairmen held a series of meetings for the purpose of bringing the positions closer together and of agreeing, as far as possible, on the text of an appropriate article of the treaty dealing with the basic tasks and obligations and time limit of Stage I. The representatives of India and the Peoples' Republic of Bulgaria were invited to attend the first of those meetings, on 31 July, and at that time they made additional comments on their previous proposals. My delegation wishes to thank all of the other delegations for their general comments, and in particular the delegations of India and Bulgaria for their specific suggestions, all of which have proved helpful in the further consideration given to this topic in the co-Chairmen's meetings.

Having taken into account the proposals that have been submitted by all other delegations, the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union in their capacity as co-Chairmen have prepared a working draft of Article 4 of Part II of the Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World, entitled "Basic Tasks and Obligations and Time Limit of Stage I". That document was circulated this morning by the Secretariat as a conference document (ENDC/55) and is before the Committee for consideration.

As in the drafts of the preamble (ENDC/L.7) and part I (ENDC/40/Rev.1) of the treaty, where the two co-Chairmen were unable to reach agreement on specific language the United States preference has been shown in single brackets and the preference of the Soviet Union in double brackets. The first example of that can be found in the heading of the document, "Working Draft of Article 4 of Part II of the Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament (in a Peaceful World) proposed by the USA and USSR". We regret that the Soviet Union is still unable to accept the phrase "in a peaceful world" in connexion with the treaty on general and complete disarmament. Therefore the words "in a peaceful world" must appear in the heading within single brackets, indicating that the phrase is a United States preference so far not accepted by the Soviet Union.

(The Chairman, United States)

At this time I should like to comment briefly on some of the provisions of article 4 which are now before the Committee in document ENDC/55. Complete agreement, I am happy to say, has been reached upon the title, the introductory sentence, and the text of paragraphs 5 and 6. Those paragraphs include specific undertakings to take measures to reduce the risk of war and strengthen arrangements for the maintenance of international peace and security. Although those areas of agreement are limited, we welcome them. We also hope that we will be able to return to this article dealing with basic obligations after we have completed our discussion and drafting of succeeding particular provisions of stage I, and at that time widen the area of agreement.

Let me turn now to a consideration of the paragraphs on which we were unable to reach complete agreement with our Soviet colleagues. It is apparent that the major difference between us lies in paragraph 1. We have each set forth our own version of that paragraph. In paragraph 1 the United States preferred text sets forth the basic obligation of the parties to the treaty

"To reduce their armaments, including nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and major conventional armaments, and to limit their production of such armaments." On the other hand, the Soviet preference -- in double brackets -- sets forth the obligation

"To eliminate all delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons and to halt completely their production simultaneously with the elimination of all military foreign bases in alien territories and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from such territories."

The basic disagreement so far between the balanced United States plan and the imbalanced plan of the Soviet Union in the area of reduction of armaments has been extensively considered in our previous meetings, and the arguments are available in the verbatim records. Therefore I do not wish to labour that point further today. Suffice it to say that my delegation remains firmly convinced that, in accordance with the joint statement of agreed principles (ENDC/5), the United States preference for paragraph 1 sets forth what we regard as a balanced, realistic and workable approach to the problem of the reduction of armaments in stage I. It is balanced, I submit, because it calls for an across-the-board reduction of the entire war-making capability of nations. It is realistic, I submit, because it does not attempt to draw any technically-unsound distinctions between all potential means of delivering nuclear weapons and other types of major armaments.

(The Chairman, United States)

Paragraph 2 of the working draft of article 4 reads:

"To carry out measures in the field of nuclear disarmament (including halting the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons.)"

This paragraph, as will be seen, is substantially the former paragraph 4 of the United States draft (ENDC/L.18). Our former proposal for "measures to reduce the threat of nuclear war" has been revised to read "measures in the field of nuclear disarmament", taking account of the suggestion made by the representative of India at our co-Chairmen's meeting on 31 July, which was subsequently also incorporated into the revised Bulgarian draft (ENDC/L.17/Rev.1).

The United States preferred phrase "including halting the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons" has been included at the end of paragraph 2 within single brackets. It is the position of my Government that a specific undertaking of that nature is an important and constructive measure in the field of nuclear disarmament which should be included in stage I. The United States believes that a disarmament programme aimed at eliminating the threat of nuclear war would be incomprehensible if, throughout the entire first stage, States were permitted to continue an unrestrained race by enlarging their stocks of fissionable materials and consequently enlarging their stocks of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, our Soviet colleagues do not agree with us on this point. Therefore we have set forth this specific measure within single brackets.

The United States preferred text for paragraph 3 reads as follows: "To reduce their armed forces and (to take agreed measures relating to) their military expenditures." The language appearing within single brackets, "to take agreed measures relating to" requires a brief explanation. The United States is in favour of a reduction in military expenditures throughout all three stages of disarmament. The amount of that reduction would result from the reduction in armaments and armed forces that occurred.

However, if article 4 contained a basic obligation "to reduce their military expenditures", as is now the case in the Soviet double-bracketed preference for paragraph 3, we believe that in the article of the treaty dealing with military expenditures it would be necessary to spell out in precise terms, first, the amount of the reduction and, second, a procedure for verifying the fact that the agreed amount of reduction had actually been made. Because of the difficulties inherent in verifying compliance with an obligation merely "to reduce military expenditures"

(The Chairman, United States)

the United States outline treaty proposes, as first stage measures dealing with the problem of military expenditures, that the parties to the treaty would submit reports on their military expenditures and, in the light of an examination of the feasibility of verifying reductions, appropriate measures would be implemented. We have suggested to our Soviet colleagues that we would agree to omit the phrase "to take agreed measures relating to", now appearing within brackets, if they would agree to substitute "to take agreed measures relating to the verifiable reduction of their military expenditures." However, so far that has not been acceptable to the Soviet Union.

We have, of course, included in our proposal a reduction of major conventional armaments in paragraph 1 of the draft article 4 along with the reduction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. However, the Soviet Union has included in its version of paragraph 3, in double brackets, the obligation to reduce "conventional armaments, their production of such armaments". As I said, this language appears within double brackets as a Soviet preference.

In the light of the sweeping definition -- referred to by Mr. Godber this morning -- which has been given by our Soviet colleagues to the term "delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons", and of the fact that all such armaments are to be completely eliminated under paragraph 1 of the Soviet double-bracketed text, the question arises exactly what types of armaments the Soviet Union would reduce in accordance with its obligation under paragraph 3. We look forward to a detailed consideration of that question when we reach sub-paragraph 5(c) on our procedure of work (ENDC/52), which deals specifically with "Disarmament measures in regard to conventional armaments".

I would point out that the only word not agreed upon in paragraph 4 is the word "disarmament" which appears in double brackets before the word "obligations". My delegation has agreed substantially to the Bulgarian text of the revised draft article 4 (ENDC/L.17/Rev.1) which was at one time acceptable to and, indeed, was accepted by the representative of the Soviet Union (ENDC/PV.62, p.47). In the interest of reaching agreement we have also eliminated from our original proposal (ENDC/L.18) paragraph 6 which contained the obligation "To implement the measures set forth hereafter for verifying compliance with the obligations undertaken;" The words "in the agreed manner" set forth in paragraph 4 include in a less explicit form an obligation to implement the measures for verifying compliance with the treaty.

(The Chairman, United States)

The Soviet delegation has, however, now insisted on inserting the words "disarmament" before the word "obligations", so as to subtract something from the word "obligations". I do not know precisely what it does subtract, but obviously the insertion of the word "disarmament" subtracts something. My delegation is of course aware of the special and restricted meaning that the Soviet Union has attached to the word "disarmament" in the context of verification -- that is, restricting disarmament obligations with respect to verification to verifying armaments destroyed without verifying that agreed levels of retained armaments and forces are not exceeded. Therefore, in order to prevent any ambiguity in our position we prefer to leave this word "disarmament" within double brackets. We continue to adhere to the principle that verification of disarmament measures includes verification that agreed levels of armaments and armed forces are not exceeded in addition to verification that agreed reductions have been carried out. Our views on this matter are set forth in greater detail in the correspondence that Mr. McCloy and I exchanged with Mr. Zorin last September (A/4887). In an effort to reach agreement on this paragraph, in lieu of the word "disarmament" we suggested that the word "treaty" inserted before the word "obligations" might provide a solution, but our Soviet colleagues preferred the insertion of the word "disarmament" and declined to use the word "treaty".

Paragraph 7, the last of the numbered paragraphs of article 4, appears entirely within single brackets indicating that it reflects United States preference. The paragraph contains an obligation

"To carry out all other obligations undertaken with respect to stage I of the treaty."

We fail to understand why such a paragraph is unacceptable to the Soviet Union. As a matter of fact the Soviet delegation offered to accept paragraph 7 if the United States delegation would accept the word "disarmament" before the word "obligations" in paragraph 4 -- a matter which I have just explained.

Our reasons for believing that paragraph 7 should be included are that we believe that any nation entering into the treaty must intend to carry out faithfully all its obligations. It is a basic obligation, we believe, to carry out all -- and I emphasize all -- treaty obligations and not just some of them. Secondly, such a

(The Chairman, United States)

"catch-all" provision gives a certain amount of necessary flexibility, as was suggested by the representative of India, to the introductory article of stage I. Thus, with such a provision, a specific reference to measures with respect to outer space and other important undertakings of stage I is not necessary. For those reasons my delegation believes that paragraph 7 should be included, otherwise we may become involved in a good deal of unnecessary specific details.

The last paragraph of the working draft of article 4 deals with the time limit of stage I and the transition from stage I to stage II. The United States position is that in the light of the measures which we propose to undertake during stage I three years would be required for their carrying out and for verification. The Soviet Union has extended its original proposal, as this Committee is aware, by three months. That makes the total length of time from the entry into force of the treaty to the completion of stage I in the Soviet plan twenty-four months instead of the previous twenty-one months.

During the course of our discussions the two co-Chairmen have agreed on the text of a separate sentence to cover the important subject of transition. That sentence, which appears at the end of the working draft of article 4, provides

"Hereafter, taking account of the provisions of Article \_\_\_\_\_, the Parties to the Treaty shall proceed to the measures provided for in Stage II of the Treaty."

Article \_\_\_\_\_ would deal with the procedure for transition from stage I to stage II of the treaty.

The United States Government considers transition from one stage to the next to be a critical phase in the disarmament process. Our position is that prior to proceeding from stage I to stage II all parties would want to know that all undertakings of stage I had been carried out, that all preparations required for stage II had been made and, further, that all militarily significant States had become parties to the treaty. The existence of similar circumstances would be necessary prior to transition from stage II to stage III.

Because of the importance which my Government attaches to the procedure for accomplishing transition, section I of stage I and section H of stage II of the United States treaty outline (ENDC/30, pp.19, 26) provide that the control council shall determine whether the circumstances required for transition exist. Section I of stage III, (ibid., p.32), contains similar provisions for the completion of stage III.

(The Chairman, United States)

The United States treaty outline in its present form also provides that in the event that any permanent member of the control council should declare that the required conditions did not exist the question would be referred to a special meeting of the Security Council of the United Nations. The reason for suggesting that procedure was to give assurance that the required obligations were being fulfilled and also to ensure that, in the event that some problems arose, those problems would quickly receive attention at a very high political level, thus facilitating their solution.

During the course of our discussions in plenary meetings of the Committee and at informal meetings prior to the recess some consideration was given to the method of proceeding from one stage to the next. My Government has very carefully evaluated the statements and proposals on this problem made by the various delegations, including the suggestions of the representative of India. My Government has reconsidered, in the light of our discussions here, its own position with regard to the question of transition and has reached a decision to modify its position on this important subject. Accordingly I have submitted to the Secretariat, and have asked to have circulated as a Conference document, the text of certain amendments to the United States outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world relating to transition.<sup>1</sup> Those amendments read as follows:

"Stage I, Section I, Transition

"1. During the last three months of Stage I, the control council would review the situation respecting the following listed circumstances with a view to determining, in the light of specified criteria, whether these circumstances existed at the end of Stage I;

- a. All undertakings to be carried out in Stage I had been carried out.
- b. All preparations required for Stage II had been made; and
- c. All militarily significant states had become parties to the treaty.

"2. Transition from Stage I to Stage II would take place at the end of Stage I or at the end of any periods of extension of Stage I, upon a determination, in the light of specified criteria, by affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of the Control Council, including at least the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that the foregoing circumstances existed.

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(The Chairman, United States)

"3. If, at the end of Stage I, one or more permanent members of the Control Council should declare that the foregoing circumstances did not exist, the agreed period of Stage I would, upon the request of such permanent member or members, be extended by a period or periods totalling no more than three months for the purpose of bringing about the foregoing circumstances.

"4. Upon the expiration of such period or periods, the Control Council would again consider whether the foregoing circumstances did in fact exist and would vote upon transition in the manner specified in paragraph 2 above.

"Stage II, Section H. Transition

"1. During the last three months of Stage II, the Control Council would review the situation respecting the following listed circumstances with a view to determining, in the light of specified criteria, whether these circumstances existed at the end of Stage II.

"a. All undertakings to be carried out in Stage II had been carried out.

b. All preparations required for Stage III had been made; and

c. All states possessing armed forces and armaments had become parties to the treaty.

"2. Transition from Stage II to Stage III would take place at the end of Stage II or at the end of any periods of extension of Stage II upon a determination, in the light of specified criteria, by affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of the Control Council, including at least the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that the foregoing circumstances existed.

"3. If, at the end of Stage II, one or more permanent members of the Control Council should declare that the foregoing circumstances did not exist, the agreed period of Stage II would, upon the request of such permanent member or members, be extended by a period or periods totalling no more than three months for the purpose of bringing about the foregoing circumstances.

"4. Upon the expiration of such period or periods, the Control Council would again consider whether the foregoing circumstances did in fact exist and would vote upon transition in the manner specified in paragraph 2 above.

"Stage III, Section I - Completion of Stage III

"1. At the end of the time period agreed for Stage III, the Control Council would review the situation with a view to determining whether all undertakings to be carried out in Stage III had been carried out.

"2. This determination would be made by affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of the Control Council, including at least the United

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States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. If an affirmative determination were made. Stage III would be deemed completed.

"3. In the event that one or more of the permanent members of the Control Council should declare that such undertakings had not been carried out, the agreed period of Stage III would, upon the request of such permanent member or members, be extended for a period or periods totalling no more than three months for the purpose of completing any uncompleted undertakings. Upon the expiration of such period or periods, the Control Council would again consider whether such undertakings had been carried out and would vote upon the question in the manner specified in paragraph 2 above.

"4. After the completion of Stage III, the obligations undertaken in Stages I, II and III would continue."

I should like now to outline in preliminary fashion the substance of my Government's new position on the procedure for transition. Of course, we shall wish to discuss this matter in more detail when sub-paragraph 5(k) of the agreed procedure of work (ENEC/52), which deals specifically with transition, is the subject of the Committee's work.

In the first place, it is now the belief of the United States that the decision on transition can and should be made by the control council of the international disarmament organization.

Second, that decision should be reached on the basis of certain established criteria or conditions for transition. A clear statement of those criteria or conditions will have to be developed when we have determined the nature of the obligations each party to the treaty would undertake in the various stages. However, the specific conditions to be spelled out in the treaty would be based upon the general provisions set forth in the United States draft treaty outline, namely, that all undertakings had been carried out, that preparation required for the following stage had been completed, that all militarily significant States had become parties to the treaty prior to transition from stage I to stage II, and all States possessing armed forces and armaments had become parties to the treaty prior to transition from stage II to stage III.

It is the position of my Government that the decision of the control council that the criteria or conditions for transition had been met should be based on a two-thirds vote, including the concurring votes of at least the United States and the Soviet Union. It is generally recognized, I believe, that for the disarmament process to proceed successfully the United States and the Soviet Union

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at least must be satisfied that the obligations of the treaty are being carried out. We therefore believe that that fact should be explicitly recognized. We also believe that it would not be proper at this time to prejudge the question whether the affirmative vote of some other major Power or Powers in addition to the United States and the Soviet Union ought to be required prior to transition. The new amendments to the United States treaty outline which we have submitted today admit the possibility of specifically requiring the concurrence of an additional major Power or Powers in the vote by the control council on the question of transition. They require the

"... affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of the Control Council, including at least the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ...".

Under the new United States proposal the decision of the control council on the question of transition would be final and binding.

At our meeting of 3 August the representative of Ethiopia quoted to us an Ethiopian saying to the effect that -

"Those who suspect each other walk side by side, but never one before the other." (ENDC/PV.65, p.10).

I think it most unfortunate, but I am afraid that in the present plight of the world that is a succinct statement of the way we would wish to proceed through the transition process and along the road towards general and complete disarmament, when I sincerely hope there will be no further suspicion. Not only would we wish to walk side by side with our Soviet colleagues, but we should also like to reassure ourselves by an appropriate look in their direction from time to time to make sure we are both in step.

I believe that the position I have just outlined on the question of transition provides a reasonable assurance to the parties to the treaty that, prior to proceeding from one stage of disarmament to the next, they will in fact be in step.

I want to take this opportunity to thank my co-Chairman for his patience and for the amount of time he has spent trying to work out the document that is before us this morning as document ENDC/55.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): The main body of my remarks this morning, which will be rather brief, will be concerned with correcting some misunderstandings which appear to exist regarding what I said on 6 August (ENDC/PV.66). Before I enter

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

into that, however, I should first like to record the satisfaction of the delegation of Canada with the extent to which it has been possible to agree on a text for article 4 of the draft treaty. I should like also to congratulate the co-Chairmen on what has been achieved to date, although, as we well know, many important matters remain, which we hope it will be possible to agree upon eventually after more detailed discussions of the various measures which will come within stage I.

Secondly, the Canadian delegation would like to welcome the statement which the Chairman has just made in regard to the new position on transition and the amendments to the United States outline of basic provisions for a treaty on general and complete disarmament which give effect to this changed position. The Canadian delegation feels that this is a helpful step forward and that it has met some of the objections to the previous language on transition which were voiced in earlier meetings of the Committee.

On 6 August the representative of the Soviet Union replied to the statement which I had made earlier in the same meeting, and I should like to point out that he misunderstood or misinterpreted what I said, and in a way that I think was quite serious. The length of our last meeting made it inconvenient to reply immediately, but I feel that I cannot let the exchange which took place then pass into the records without correction. The subject on which that exchange took place was the Soviet proposal for the complete elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles in stage I. Mr. Zorin quoted me correctly as having said:

"But the representative of the Soviet Union knows very well that the West is not going to destroy all its nuclear weapon vehicles until it has been made perfectly certain that the means of delivering nuclear weapons are eliminated from Soviet Union territory and the territory of its allies and friends." (ENDC/PV.66, p.44)

He interpreted (ibid.) my statement as meaning that the West expected the East to eliminate completely all its means of delivery of nuclear weapons before the Western Powers, in their turn, would start to eliminate any of their own means of delivery, and I feel that in that interpretation Mr. Zorin did not pay sufficient attention to the word "all" in the expression I used, and I quote again from the passage I have already read:

"... the West is not going to destroy all its nuclear weapon vehicles..."

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

To put it in slightly different terms or words, which may make the meaning clearer, the Western nations, assuming that they were to accept the Soviet proposal for complete elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles in stage I, would have to have adequate assurance that all -- and I repeat all -- nuclear weapon vehicles belonging to the Soviet Union and its allies would in fact be destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes, and that none could remain hidden, before the West could undertake similar action. Now, I hope that no one will believe that I would be so unreasonable as to propose, as Mr. Zorin has suggested that I did, that the Soviet Union must first destroy all its nuclear weapon vehicles before the West would destroy any of its own.

Mr. Zorin also quoted the following from what I had said:

" That could mean that before destruction could take place, teams of inspectors must go everywhere in those territories where they think that any of those vehicles might be concealed, and make sure that none are hidden away and that all those declared in the inventory and located for destruction are, in fact, the only nuclear weapons vehicles existing. " (ibid.)

He said that that implied control before disarmament, and such an approach, he said, was utterly unreasonable. I quite expected that the representative of the Soviet Union would find such a condition impossible; but it is not, as he suggested, necessarily implied in the Western approach to the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles. However, it is a condition which would have to be fulfilled if the Soviet proposal for the complete elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles at one stroke in stage I were to conform with the agreed principles.

Why does absolute verification follow as an inescapable condition to the Soviet proposal? The time period in that proposal for the elimination of vehicles is so brief that it would necessitate the two sides' destroying their vehicles practically simultaneously, and surely it must be clear to everyone that neither side would be prepared to take such action before it was perfectly satisfied that the other side would be taking exactly the same action. If the West were to enter into any such agreement, it would wish to carry it out faithfully and to destroy 100 per cent of its nuclear weapon delivery vehicles; but before doing so it would wish to be absolutely certain that the Soviet Union would also destroy 100 per cent of its vehicles.

How could such an assurance be obtained except by ascertaining before the actual destruction took place that the declarations furnished by the States parties to the agreement really and truly represented 100 per cent of their vehicles? Of course

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

this does imply control before disarmament -- or, more specifically, control before demolition and destruction of nuclear weapon vehicles. Such an approach is unacceptable to the Soviet Union, as it has told us very many times. But if the Soviet Union is not prepared to agree to such verification, how can it expect the West to agree to the Soviet proposal for 100 per cent elimination in stage I? It is for Mr. Zorin to tell us, clearly and unequivocally, how the Soviet Union would propose to give the assurance that all Soviet nuclear vehicles were listed and located for destruction without giving the information which, as the Soviet delegation claims, would lay the Soviet Union open to a preventive attack.

It is not the West which is asking for control before disarmament, but it is the Soviet Union which is inviting it by submitting proposals of such an absolute and impractical character that their implementation could not be carried out in any other way. The West is proposing that the amount of verification should be proportionate to the amount of disarmament and that it should be gradually increased as disarmament proceeds until control becomes complete with the achievement of general and complete disarmament.

The representative of the Soviet Union was tolerant enough to suggest (ENDC/PV.66, p.45) that something had happened to my powers of reasoning on Monday. Well, I do not think they were any worse on Monday than at any other time, but something did happen to his interpretation of what I said and I hope that I have now made my meaning fully clear. And I would respectfully suggest that if he would have someone look up all my previous statements he would be able to be informed that I have been consistent in my approach to the inescapable problem of verification raised by the Soviet proposal for the complete elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles in the first stage of disarmament.

In the course of today's meeting the representative of Czechoslovakia referred (supra, p.17) to some of my remarks at our previous meeting, in the first place in regard to the calculation of the effective forces which could be brought into confrontation in a decisive way in Western Europe if the Soviet proposal for stage I of a disarmament treaty were brought into effect. I do not wish to weary the Conference with a detailed discussion of strategic matters, but I feel that if this question were to be gone into usefully it really would require discussion on an expert level; and while I do not in any sense retreat from what I said previously in this regard I do not feel that further discussion in the necessarily brief and

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incomplete manner which any representative in this Conference -- and I include myself -- would be able to deal with the subject in plenary meetings would be useful. I do not think we would reach any agreed conclusions. If the matter is one which should be considered further, in the opinion of the Conference, then let us have our military experts, whom we all have with us, have a sub-committee meeting on the matter, and perhaps they will be able to elucidate it further.

The second point raised by the representative of Czechoslovakia to which I would like to refer briefly is in connexion with his interpretation (supra, p.20) of what I said about the powers of inspectors of the international disarmament organization. He seemed to imply that I thought they would be of no use whatever. That, of course, is far from the truth, because we know and everybody else knows that the inspection of disarmament measures is necessary and there is provision for it in both our treaties, in the provisions regarding an international disarmament organization. What I did point out had reference particularly to the suggestion that the presence of inspectors of the international disarmament organization at sites where there were rockets nominally for peaceful purposes would be an absolute guarantee that those rockets could not be used for other than peaceful purposes; and as for that, I said, inspectors would not have means at their disposal to prevent improper use of the rockets. Neither is it proposed in the one treaty or the other that they should have force at their disposal; and, not having force at their disposal, they could be pushed out of the way if a sufficient crisis occurred in the opinion of a party which had those rockets.

I hope the explanation of the particular context in which I said that disarmament inspectors would not be a sufficient safeguard is now made clear to the representative of Czechoslovakia.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, I see that the hour is getting late. I shall therefore not try now to reply to a number of remarks and statements, in particular to the rather lengthy statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom, since there is simply not enough time to discuss a number of questions which he raised. Nor shall I now reply to certain remarks made by the representative of Canada in clarifying his earlier statement. I should like to ask the Committee to allow me fifteen to eighteen minutes in which to deal with questions relating to today's agreed and non-agreed text of the working draft of article 4 of the treaty. Since the United States

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representative has already submitted his explanations on this matter I ask for permission to give my explanations too. If there are no objections perhaps the Committee will bear with me until 1.30 p.m.

I shall make only one brief remark on the cessation of tests, a matter on which several representatives have spoken this morning including the representatives of Brazil and India. In particular, Mr. Lall, the representative of India, put forward a number of important considerations throwing light on the position and urgently stressing the need for the speediest solution of the problem of the cessation of nuclear tests. We also fully share the views expressed by the representatives of Brazil and India concerning the need for the speediest conclusion of an agreement on the discontinuance of all nuclear weapon tests. We fully agree with their general approach to the problem.

At the same time it seems to us exceedingly important and noteworthy that the representative of India emphasized the common basis which we have for such an agreement in the form of the memorandum of the eight non-aligned States (ENDC/28). He stressed that both sides had undertaken to conduct negotiations on the basis of this memorandum and that the latest scientific data confirmed the validity of the basic principles of the memorandum.

We quite agree that it is precisely on the basis of the eight-Power memorandum that agreement on the cessation of all tests can be reached. This basis is entirely acceptable to us, and it is precisely on this basis that we are prepared to conduct further negotiations and to conclude an appropriate agreement.

I shall make no further remarks on this question for the time being. I will now request the Committee's attention with regard to the proposals submitted after fairly lengthy study by the two co-Chairmen concerning article 4 of the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/55).

The co-Chairmen of the Committee - the representative of the Soviet Union and the representative of the United States - submitted for consideration by all members of the Committee a Working Draft of Article 4 of Part II of the treaty on general and complete disarmament, entitled "Basic Tasks and Obligations and Time Limit of Stage I."

In preparing this working draft of article 4, the co-Chairmen endeavoured to bring the two positions closer together and to take fully into account the constructive suggestions made by delegations during our discussions on this draft article in plenary meetings of the Committee. The co-Chairmen also considered the



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specific proposals regarding this article which were submitted by the representatives of Bulgaria (ENDC/L.17/Rev.1) and India (ENDC/FV.63, pp.6,8,9).

What is the outcome of the co-Chairmen's work? A number of provisions have been agreed upon relating to the substance of certain disarmament measures to be carried out in stage I. For example, the co-Chairmen agreed that in stage I the States must carry out measures in the field of nuclear disarmament (paragraph 2), reduce their armed forces (paragraph 3), establish the International Disarmament Organization (paragraph 4), take measures to reduce the risk of war (paragraph 5) and take steps to strengthen arrangements for the maintenance of international peace and security (paragraph 6). In accordance with the proposal made by the representative of India, the co-Chairmen agreed to insert in the draft article 4 a clause to the effect that after the completion of stage I, the States would proceed to the implementation of the disarmament measures provided for in stage 2, taking into account the provisions of the appropriate article of the treaty.

Of course, the agreement of the co-Chairmen on all these paragraphs has its significance, as has also the agreement achieved on the heading of this article. At the same time, the Soviet delegation deems it necessary to state here, in this plenary meeting of the Committee, that on the main provisions of article 4 relating to the most important disarmament measures for stage I, the co-Chairmen were unable to reach agreement.

In the first place, there is no agreement on the question of the main disarmament measures in stage I, as can be seen from the two radically different wordings proposed for paragraph 1 of the working draft of article 4.

The Soviet Union starts from the assumption that in stage I of general and complete disarmament, effective measures must be carried out to eliminate the threat of nuclear war. We know that this view is shared by many delegations represented in our Committee. Advocating drastic radical measures to eliminate the threat of nuclear war in stage I, the Soviet Union proposes, as stated in our wording for this paragraph of the article, to eliminate in this stage all delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons and to halt their production simultaneously with the elimination of military foreign bases in alien territories and the withdrawal of foreign troops from such territories. These would be practical steps towards getting rid of the threat of nuclear war! We can have no doubt that people in all countries of the world would be greatly relieved if we succeeded in reaching agreement on this basis.

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But we have not succeeded in doing so. The United States delegation stubbornly objected, and still objects, to the elimination of all delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons and to the cessation of their production, to the elimination of all military foreign bases in alien territories and to the withdrawal of foreign troops from such territories. During the meetings of our Committee, the Soviet delegation has repeatedly shown the roots of this attitude of the United States, an attitude not at all concerned with the interests of real disarmament, but aimed at obtaining one-sided military advantages for the Western Powers to the detriment of the Soviet Union's security and that of all socialist and other peace-loving States.

A number of other questions have remained unsolved, and in this connexion we would like to draw the attention of members of the Committee first of all to paragraph 2 of draft article 4. In this we have an agreed text -- "to carry out measures in the field of nuclear weapons", and this has been included in the draft proposal at our suggestion, in order to take into account the wishes expressed, in particular, by the representatives of India and Bulgaria. It would seem that this wording covers all the measures in the field of nuclear disarmament which States could agree to carry out in stage I. Nevertheless, the United States delegation insisted on including in the text of paragraph 2, as the United States preference, the following words:

"(, including halting the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons)."

It is well known, however, that the corresponding United States proposal, in the first place, is not a measure in the field of nuclear disarmament nor of disarmament in general, in so far as it does not provide for the prohibition of nuclear weapons, the destruction of stockpiles, or even a reduction in the quantities of nuclear weapons at the disposal of States. Furthermore, the implementation of such a measure could only create the illusion that nevertheless some steps are being taken in the field of nuclear disarmament, whereas in reality States would continue to have at their disposal all their existing nuclear weapons, as well as the huge stocks of fissionable materials existing at the present time, which they would still be able to use for the further production of nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, the United States of America, as it has itself explained more than once, has in mind to establish control over the entire atomic production of States, for the purpose of verifying their compliance with the obligation to cease the

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production of fissionable materials for military purposes. This is control without disarmament, that is to say, an undisguised form of military espionage, something which will of course be unacceptable to any State having regard for its security.

In view of all these considerations the Soviet delegation, in the course of the work of the co-Chairmen, objected to the addition of this wording to draft article 4.

We also had serious difficulties in reaching agreement on the provision in paragraph 3 of draft article 4, relating to reduction of military expenditures. It seemed to us an obvious truth that as a result of implementation of the disarmament measures of stage I, the States should substantially reduce their military expenditure. Furthermore, in paragraph 1 of article 13 of our draft treaty, we indicated how the resources made available in this way should be used. The second clause of this paragraph reads:

"The funds released through the implementation of the first-stage measures shall be used for peaceful purposes, including the reduction of taxes on the population and the subsidizing of the national economy. At the same time a certain portion of the funds, thus released, shall be diverted to economic and technical assistance to under-developed countries. The size of this portion shall be subject to agreement between the parties to the Treaty." (ENDC/2, p.11)

In accordance with all this we proposed to insert in paragraph 3 of draft article 4 a clear and precise provision to the effect that the States parties to the treaty undertake to reduce their military expenditures.

We did not expect that even on this question, which is so obvious to all, the United States would adopt a different position. It has turned out, however, that this is indeed the case. The United States delegation rejected our wording regarding the reduction by States of their military expenditures, and preferred the wording that the States parties to the treaty would "take agreed measures relating to their military expenditures."

Today Mr. Dean has explained (supra, p.36) what is meant by agreed measures. He indicated that under the United States plan in stage I the parties to the treaty would submit reports on their military expenditures and the feasibility of verifying them would be examined. What sort of agreed measures are these? The position of the United States delegation in reaching agreement on paragraph 3 of draft article 4 is such that it gives us grounds for surmising the worst, namely, that under the pretext of the unfeasibility of verification the United States not only does not

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intend to reduce its military expenditures in stage I, but may even be thinking of further increasing its appropriations for military purposes during the very process of disarmament. In any case it is difficult to find any other interpretation for the United States position in regard to military expenditures, because it is opposed to stating straightforwardly that military expenditures are to be reduced. We fail to understand this position.

A serious difficulty also arose in reaching agreement on paragraph 4 which deals with the establishment of an international disarmament organization. The two sides agree that such an organization should be established upon the entry into force of the treaty in order, as stated in paragraph 4, "to ensure verification in the agreed manner of the obligations undertaken." It emerged, however, that we obviously understand in different ways the nature of the obligations to be undertaken by States under a treaty on general and complete disarmament. We proceed from the premise that the obligations undertaken by States under such a treaty will be disarmament obligations. It is precisely this word "disarmament" which we proposed to include in the text of paragraph 4 so as to make it clear that it concerns verification of the disarmament obligations undertaken.

The United States delegation, however, categorically refused to include the word "disarmament" in the text of paragraph 4. This United States position can only be understood as meaning that it wishes to secure for itself an opportunity of verifying not only disarmament measures but something else as well. In other words, it is trying to achieve the establishment of control without disarmament, that is, as we have repeatedly explained, the establishment of a legalized system of espionage to which, of course, we can in no way agree.

So the word "disarmament" remained unagreed in paragraph 4 of the working draft of article 4! To conduct negotiations on general and complete disarmament and then to object to the inclusion of the word "disarmament" in the text of the paragraph defining the tasks of the international disarmament organization is surely a most striking revelation of the ambiguous attitude of the United States, far removed from the interests of disarmament and of strengthening peace throughout the world! We regret to have to say this, but it would be wrong to keep silence about it.

The United States delegation also stubbornly insisted on including in the working draft of article 4 a paragraph 7, which provides that the States parties to the treaty undertake "To carry out all other obligations undertaken with respect to Stage I of the Treaty." We tried patiently to find out what was the meaning of

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this paragraph on which the United States delegation insisted so much. If we approach the matter from the standpoint of sound logic, then, in the article defining the basic tasks and the obligations of States in the first stage of general and complete disarmament, there cannot be any room for such a paragraph.

If we speak about basic tasks and obligations they must be enumerated, and they are in fact enumerated in the working draft of article 4. They are disarmament measures in regard to nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, foreign military bases, foreign troops in alien territories, nuclear armaments, conventional armaments, armed forces and military expenditures. We can also include among the basic tasks and obligations the establishment of an international disarmament organization and measures to reduce the risk of war as well as measures to strengthen arrangements for the maintenance of international peace and security.

What else is there? What is missing, from the point of view of the United States delegation, in this list of basic tasks and obligations? We were unable to obtain an answer to this question. And it is precisely the absence of an answer that leads us to suppose that the United States of America intends to secure the inclusion in stage I of certain measures about which for some reason or other they do not wish to speak openly at present but for which they wish to retain a definite possibility. The Soviet delegation did not and does not consider it possible to include in the draft of article 4 such vague, indefinite and ambiguous provisions.

If one takes into consideration a remark made by Mr. Dean today, it appears that what he is anxious about is that the provisions in article 1 should not leave anything out, including, let us say, measures in regard to outer space and so on. However, I should like to draw Mr. Dean's attention to the fact that in the agreed draft of Part I of the treaty it is already stated -- you and I drafted this together: "The Parties to the Treaty undertake to carry out the provisions set forth in the Treaty and in its Annexes". We have already undertaken to carry out any provision contained in the treaty. Then why should we state again at every stage that we undertake to carry out all other obligations? This is already covered in the first introductory article of the treaty, namely, that we undertake to carry out all the provisions. Article 4 deals with basic tasks and obligations. These basic tasks and obligations have already been enumerated. Therefore there is no sense in having paragraph 7.

Finally, we could not agree on the time limit for the first stage either. In endeavouring to bring our positions closer together the Soviet Union made a move

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to meet the position of the United States in this matter, and submitted a proposal to carry out the disarmament measures of stage I within twenty-four months instead of fifteen months as we had first suggested -- in other words, within two years. Moreover, we considered it possible not to have a special preparatory period of six months within stage I itself, as was the case in our original draft, but to utilize the entire period of this stage, that is twenty-four months, for the direct implementation of the disarmament measures themselves.

Frankly speaking, we expected that the United States of America would also take definite steps to meet us halfway. We thought that on the question of the time limit for the first stage it would be able to show some flexibility. But it turned out otherwise. The United States delegation flatly refused to seek for agreement on the question of the first stage and adhered to its long drawn out and completely unjustified time limit of three years.

Such are the results of the work of the co-Chairmen on the working draft of article 4 of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. It is difficult to consider such results promising for our future work on agreeing the articles relating to stage I. It must be noted that the steps taken by the Soviet Government to meet the Western Powers have met with no response, and therefore the task of agreeing the articles of stage I remains a difficult one. It is not our fault, but we cannot fail to express concern in connexion with this situation.

The peoples of the world expect from us practical results in agreeing a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament. But every time we try to agree the appropriate text of the articles - in this case the text of article 4 of the treaty -- we come up against the desire of the United States to enclose all the important and substantive elements in brackets. But it is obvious that, so long as the main disarmament measures remain in brackets, there will be no disarmament. The brackets must be removed. We appeal once again to the United States delegation to delete them so that together we can submit a working draft of article 4 of the treaty on general and complete disarmament for the consideration of the Committee in plenary meeting. The brackets must be deleted -- it is necessary that the proceedings should lead to real disarmament!

As to the questions raised in the statements made by various representatives, including those of the United Kingdom and Canada, I shall take the liberty of answering them at our next meeting.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I note with regret that the discussion of item 5(b) is coming to its end before we have obtained sufficient clarification of the Soviet proposal on control over the total elimination of vehicles in the first stage. All the requests for explanation addressed by Western delegations to the socialist delegations have remained without any clear and satisfactory reply. This morning's meeting has provided some fresh evidence. After Mr. Godber's speech with its further precise requests about control, the Czechoslovak representative told us nothing new. The representative of the Soviet Union merely promised an answer at a future meeting. I await this, of course, with the keenest interest; but the fact remains that after prolonged discussion we do not yet know the exact meaning of the formula, so often repeated by the socialist delegations, that control of the abolition of vehicles will be 100 per cent. This statement is still obscure and enigmatic.

The Italian delegation wants to take our enquiry down on to solid ground. It refuses to give up hope of reaching clarity on this question, and therefore makes two alternative proposals. In my first proposal I request the Soviet delegation to present to the Committee a working paper on control of the abolition of vehicles in the first stage, including control over the abolition of nuclear artillery, to which my delegation has drawn the Committee's attention. It is plain that the language of the Soviet draft treaty on this question is insufficient. It merely consists of a single two-line sentence, repeated in articles 5, 6, 7 and 8. What we need is a full, detailed, explanatory document with practical examples, so that we can see exactly what the Soviet delegation has in mind.

My second proposal is put forward in case the Soviet delegation does not wish to present such a document. We should then like the Secretariat to prepare a document for the Committee collecting all the statements made by socialist delegations concerning the control of abolition of vehicles. In other words, I should like to have a full excerpt from the speeches of Mr. Zorin and the socialist delegates, to elucidate the Soviet delegation's thinking on this subject. Possibly all these passages taken together would help us to understand its thought. These two proposals are made, as I have said, to help us to understand a proposal which, despite all our efforts, is still obscure to us. That is why I hope they will be favourably considered by the Committee.

Mr. ALAMAYEHU (Ethiopia): I am intervening today to add the voice of my delegation and of my Government to the voices of the representatives of the non-aligned States who have appealed to the nuclear Powers to stop their nuclear weapon tests by concluding a test ban treaty on the basis of the eight Power memorandum (ENDC/28). The suggestions and ideas contained in that memorandum not only constitute a fair and equitable compromise between the views of the two sides but are also founded on a sound scientific basis. The validity of the ideas presented in it has been confirmed by all available scientific and technological information and has never been contested on any ground, even by the nuclear Powers themselves. The only reason so far given by the two sides for continuing to test instead of stopping such tests by concluding a test ban treaty is that the other side did it and that therefore it is right for them to do it in the interests of their national security.

But one wonders whether a race to invent more powerful and more destructive weapons could really ensure the national security of any State, particularly at the present stage of scientific and technological development. One wonders whether the United States, which invented and perfected the atom bomb before any other nation, feels more secure today than it did before the invention of the bomb. One wonders whether the Soviet Union, which went into space before any other nation, does not feel more insecure today than before as the result of the possibility of an attack from space. No, gentlemen, it is a mere illusion to think today that one's own national security would be ensured by staying in the armaments race to perfect the existing weapons of mass destruction or to invent new ones. The more you stay in the armaments race, the more you perfect your suicidal weapons, the more insecure and exposed to maximum danger you feel. The best way -- the only way -- to ensure national security for yourselves and for the world is, in our view, to stop this mad race and to destroy the monstrous weapons you have created before they destroy both you and the world.

My delegation, therefore, joins with the other representatives of the eight nations in appealing to the representatives of the nuclear Powers to agree on a nuclear test ban treaty on the basis of the compromise formula presented by the eight delegations which those Powers have already accepted as a basis for negotiations.



The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its sixty-seventh plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Dean, representative of the United States.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, Brazil, India, the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union, Italy and Ethiopia.

"The representatives of the Soviet Union and of the United States tabled a working draft of Article 4 of part II of the treaty.<sup>1</sup>

"The delegation of the United States tabled amendments to the United States Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World, relating to transition.<sup>2</sup>

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 10 August 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.45 p.m.

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1. ENDC/55

2. ENDC/30/Add.2

